DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 188 523 HE 012 797

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TITLE Higher Education Policy in Authoritarian Regimes: Comparative Perspectives on the Chilean Case.
INSTITUTION Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. Inst. for Social and Policy Studies.
REPORT NO YHERG-45
PUB DATE May 80
NOTE 64p.
AVAILABLE FROM Higher Education Research Group, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale Univ., 1732 Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Access to Education; Administration; Admission Criteria; *Authoritarianism; Case Studies; Comparative Education; *Educational Policy; Financial Policy; Governance; *Government School Relationship; *Higher Education; *Institutional Autonomy; Personnel Selection; *Political Influences
IDENTIFIERS Argentina; Brazil; *Chile

ABSTRACT

A Chilean case study of higher education under an authoritarian regime is presented. The study restricts itself to the most prevalent sub-type of the authoritarian regime which is "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" (BA). The BA designation refers to regimes which exert considerable repressive control over societies that have undergone substantial industrialization, growth of bureaucratic structures and roles, and mobilization of popular sectors. Characteristics of the BA regime are: political exclusion of popular sectors; coersion and corporatist encapsulation of popular sectors; extension of state powers, but also privatization of state institutions; economic exclusion or policies that favor certain privileged sectors; reduction of social welfare in order to attract foreign capital; technocratic perspectives rather than idealogical ones in order to build a new society; and nationalism. These characteristics affect the following five sub-policies in higher education: (1) admissions policy; (2) personnel selection (professorial and administrative); (3) academic policy (formation and content); (4) human resource distribution (teaching and research by field of endeavor); and (5) financial policy. Among the conclusions regarding the effect of authoritarianism are these: admissions policies are marked by forcible cut-backs; personnel policies are marked by repressive top-down control and fearful purges of dissidents; and academic policies include the replacement of both established student participation and the open interchange of critical ideas with mandated obedience. (LC)

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HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHILEAN CASE

by

Daniel Levy

YALE HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH GROUP
WORKING PAPER

YHERG-45

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
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May 1980

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The research reported in this paper has been part of the work conducted by the Yale Higher Education Research Group. It has been supported by research funds from the Mellon Foundation for the comparative study of academic organization and governance.

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For their comments on earlier versions of this paper, I especially thank: Barry Ames, Burton Clark, David Collier, Patricio Chaparro, David Felix, Patricia Weiss Fagen, Edmundo Fuenzalida, Louis Goodman, Tim McDaniel, Juan Morales Malva, Luis Alberto Montero, and Ernesto Schiefelbein. I also thank the many native experts on higher education, mostly Chilean, whom I interviewed. The supportive role of those associated with the Corporación Promoción Universitaria hardly could be overstated.

Introduction

Chile, since its military coup in 1973, provides a dramatic case-study of higher education policy under an authoritarian regime.[1] The utility of such a study derives in part from the fact that, while most of the politics of higher education literature understandably deals with democracies, most nations are ruled by authoritarian regimes. The study also attempts to contribute to our appreciation of the role of regime type as one important determinant of policy; methods are developed to facilitate such analysis within higher education policy.

So widespread is the authoritarian phenomenon that it is useful to restrict ourselves to a prevalent sub-type, generally referred to as "bureaucratic-authoritarianism." (BA). Acknowledging that the BA terminology "has no aesthetic value," Guillermo O'Donnell properly defends it for its distinction from other types of authoritarianism, particularly those emerging at lower socio-economic levels.[2] Briefly, the BA designation refers to regimes which exert considerable repressive control over societies which have undergone substantial industrialization, growth of bureaucratic structures and roles, and mobilization of popular sectors. It is now widely applied to the study of many of the relatively developed Latin American nations. Thus the BA is a sub-type of Juan Linz's seminal categorization of authoritarian regimes, a sub-type most directly, but certainly not exclusively, associated with O'Donnell's work.[3]

While Chile receives by far the greatest attention here,[4] Argentina (since its military coup of 1976) and Brazil (since its military coup of 1964) are included to broaden the perspective and explore different patterns. Clearly, BA is a broad category within which variation is expected. Much of this variation can be traced to the different circumstances under which BA regimes emerge. The severity of the pre-coup threat may well dictate the subsequent pattern of ruling coalitions, which consequently influence the nature of policy formation and output.

If there is a sense in which all BA regimes may act similarly when facing similar circumstances, this helps explain, not deny, real differences among them. A salient manifestation would concern the greater degree of BA ruling elite cohesion and policy backlash resulting from greater pre-coup mobilization and threats. Furthermore, it would be rash to assume that any regime necessarily behaves according to its posited general characteristics in every policy field. In fact, one may discover many policies which are not consistent with general BA characteristics, except in the tautological sense that everything that a BA regime does is BA policy. In the concluding section, I will suggest starker contrasts between Chilean patterns and distinctly non-BA policy-making in Mexico. Throughout the analysis, contrasts are naturally drawn between contemporary and pre-coup Chile.

While the study of higher education stands to gain a great deal by relating policy to political regime, the task is terribly complex and dangerous. It has certainly given political scientists a good deal of trouble. Traditionally, normative assumption dominated. "Obviously," democratic and dictatorial, civil and military, and capitalist and communist regimes produce different policies. Unfortunately, however, as political scientists and political economists have grappled less with "input" variables and more with policy "outputs" they have had little success in substantiating extant hypotheses; empirical research has generally failed to confirm widely-held assumptions about differential policy outputs.[5] Explanations for the failure have included the stubborn determinancy of economic, technological, international, or cultural factors that set the crucial parameters within which political choice is decidedly circumscribed. Thus much is attributed to the level of economic development, "dependency" or "distinct traditions." All this squares very poorly with a growing quest, even mission, among some political scientists to reassert that political choice is a vital independent

variable in determining political outcomes.

Against this background it is hardly surprising that scholars have now cast a more critical eye upon the empirical literature on policy outputs.[6] And they have established crucial reservations. Undoubtedly, deep-seated structural factors play a crucial role--but the difficulty of relating regime type to policy content is also the result of the methodological approaches employed to examine the relationship.[7] Much of the problem stems from the propensity to utilize gross categories both in the independent variables (e.g., military regimes) and the dependent variables (e.g., social-welfare expenditures). Another part stems from the propensity toward quantification of massive and diverse information, where the quantification limits the meaningfulness of the dependent variables that we can knowledgeably include (perhaps accounting for the special difficulties of finding significant differences in budgetary policies), and where the ambitious scope of the sample imposes questionably broad "macro" concepts from which to adduce policy differences.[8] We now hear the clarion call for more middle-range detailed work, emphasizing contextual and historical factors and dealing with more discriminating categories of regime types.

All this applies importantly to education and politics. Thus the orientation of this research is that we can gain certain kinds of understanding about the relationship between BA regimes and higher education policy through a middle-level analysis more than through a macro-conceptual quantification of such variables as budgetary expenditures across many systems. The attempt is to see how well the policy can be understood in terms of regime characteristics. Are the characteristics applicable, and if so, how? Do they actually help to structure and deepen our understanding of higher education policy in these regimes? The idea is not to deduce policies from posited regime characteristics. In no way should general characteristics be accepted a priori as the necessary determinants of

higher education policies. For one thing, as mentioned, we should not expect to find one single pattern of BA behavior, either across regimes or across policy fields. Then, too, even correlated traits may result from factors other than regime type. Finally, it is possible that the ideal type is being erroneously or excessively associated with a particular regime. After all, BA is a heuristic construct to help us interpret empirical observations. It must not itself impose obstacles to our primary goal of accurate empirical analysis.

As an added contribution, exploration of the relationship between policy and regime may also improve our understanding of the regime itself.[9] Obviously, we learn what a given regime is doing in a given policy field; beyond that, the policy may illustrate and concretize general defining aspects of a regime type, or, alternatively, may indicate the limited utility of the extant regime type to inform our understanding of policy. But my primary purpose here is to use regime characteristics to help understand policy. Towards that end, BA should be identified more specifically. O'Donnell, among others, has elaborated its "defining characteristics" and dynamic aspects."[10] An operational summary might include the following overlapping ones, though it might just as well be reduced for parsimony or extended for specificity: (1) "political exclusion" of popular sectors either recently incorporated or on the verge of incorporation; (2) considerable coercion and "corporatist encapsulation" to the detriment of free participation, mobilization and democratic expression, thus insuring political order; (3) substantial extension of state power, but also "privatization" of state institutions; (4) "economic exclusion," or policies much more biased than previously against lower socio-economic sectors and in favor of certain privileged sectors, thus postponing indefinitely the aspirations of the popular sectors; (5) priority on reduction of social-welfare expenditures to foster the "rational policies"

necessary to attract foreign capital and achieve capital accumulation; (6) technocratic and yet rather ideological perspectives on how to depoliticize socio-political questions in order to "cure" the system and build a new society; (7) nationalism in the sense of a strong nation and government, but a tendency to "internationalize" for efficient modernization.

Similarly, higher education policy can be disaggregated. Taken together, five sub-policies provide fairly inclusive coverage. They are: (1) admissions policy; (2) personnel selection (professorial and administrative); (3) academic policy (formation and content); (4) human resource distribution (teaching and research by field of endeavor); (5) financial policy.

Admission Policy

One of the key characteristics of BA regimes is exclusion. Most other characteristics directly relate to it or can even be derived from it. In the higher education field exclusion manifests itself most clearly through drastically and coercively restricted admissions policies.

To explore the severity of the junta's admissions policies it is useful to define certain terms rather specifically. Central to O'Donnell's concept of "exclusion" is that BA regimes deactivate some mobilized sectors. Thus they differ from "traditional authoritarian" regimes where it is enough to keep unmobilized groups from entering the system. "Exclusion" best captures the backlash nature of BA regimes, while "exclusive" adequately characterizes the less developed ones. There also seems to be an intermediate category which for want of a more apparent terms we will call "peremptory exclusion." Here the key is to block out mobilizing groups, as opposed to groups already in the system or still unmobilized groups. If the key to "exclusion" is banishment and the key to "exclusive" is omission, then the key to "peremtory exclusion" is foreclosure. There is a sense of ordinality here. Regimes which banish also foreclose and omit. (Of course it is also possible to think of exceptions where certain middle sectors are actively excluded

while certain skilled lower sectors, ready to play by the rules, may be incorporated.) In reality these three concepts may overlap.

It is indeed exclusionary politics that most strongly characterize admissions policy in Chile. If policy is exclusive in rejecting expansion, it is exclusionary both in the sense of forestalling newly mobilized groups and of actually cutting enrollments. Other salient characteristics of admissions policy include: reduction in the size of the social-welfare sector, alienation of lower and also middle sectors, imposition of technocratic, objective criteria, and great extension of state power in regulating the system.

The starkest form of exclusion is the political purge; many were purged although how many is hard to say. We will return to the purges in considering personnel selection. Thus our first measure of admissions policy is overall enrollment. In both the DC (Christian Democratic period), 1964-1970, and UP (Popular Unity period), 1970-1973, enrollments had grown dramatically, from 41,800 in 1965 to 140,000 in 1973, an average gain of 16.6%/year.[11] From 1973-1975 this growth slowed to 2.5%/year, and from 1975-1977 it declined by 5.6%/year, falling back to the 1972 mark. The sharpest decline (8.8%) came in 1976, with an apparent effort at relative stabilization ensuing.

A more sensitive measure of regime policy is the number of first year openings offered at the universities. Most previously enrolled students remained enrolled despite the purges, so that the junta could best establish its own numerical policies by controlling new admissions. From 1974-1978 vacantes fell 19%, from 42,555 to 34,277. Again the precipitous drop (16%) comes in 1976, followed by stabilization. Another measure, the vacante/enrollment ratio has declined steadily from 1973-77.[12]

The differential degrees of these cuts according to university suggest intriguing insights into junta policy which will be considered in the

discussion of personnel policies. Suffice it to note here that the University of Chile, the nation's most important, has borne the brunt of the cuts. The exact effects of regime policy in this regard are a bit tricky to unravel, however, since the University's proportional share of system enrollments had been declining even before the coup.[13] Again data on vacantes give starker indications. The University of Chile alone absorbed roughly 70% of the 1974-1978 reductions as its share of system vacantes dropped from 40% to 32%.[14] Most other universities therefore did not lose in proportional terms.

Such imposed cuts are exceptional in cross-national perspective and are the most blatant signs of authoritarian exclusion. But it is the peremptory exclusion of those already in the "access pipeline" that accounts for the greatest change. At least according to UNESCO projections, 1975 enrollments would have reached approximately 200 thousand, instead of 150 thousand, and from there the gap widens astronomically; by 1977 perhaps half the potential students may have been denied.[15] Schiefelbein and Grossi characterize as "strangulation" the fact that there are fewer vacantes in 1977 than 1971 while the number of high school graduates has more than doubled -- and trends indicate that the gap will widen.[16] Not surprisingly, the number of actual applicants, which had more than doubled from 1970 to 1973 has declined by more than 20% since that time.[17] The drop-off is due both to a slowing of secondary school growth and to student realization of the changed circumstances (difficult admission plus changed type of education plus tuition). Record rejection rates (over 60%) in 1975 led to the single biggest decline in applications, in 1976.

An important concern in all this is the extent to which the junta's access policy represents a reversal only of extraordinary U.P. policies or indeed of more secular trends dating from the D.C.'s reform begun in 1964 (or at least the fundamental University Reform begun in 1967 with basic

support from the Center to the Left). Whereas a simple look at enrollment or vacante figures might show a restoration of the pre-U.P. situation, any analysis of trends defies that conclusion. While the 1970-1973 enrollment rate of 22%/year exceeded the 1965-1970 rate of 13%/year, both rates were impressive. Furthermore, the U.P. rate itself derived largely from the explosion of secondary school rates in the late sixties.[18] This is not to deny the particular importance attached to undoing the perceived excesses of the U.P. period. In fact, the junta's perception is that this period was the logical intensified extension of Chilean party politics as practiced by the DC as well. The U.P. legacy unquestionably affords an easier stereotype to attack. The MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement) had proclaimed that admissions were a political rather than technical-educational problem: doors could swing open wider if the university would become a catalyst for social change rather than a factory for the existing system. Similarly, radical peronists mocked entrance requirements for Argentine universities in the pre-coup years. Both countries probably experienced huge increases in "non-academic students."[19] Most of all, the Chilean government repeatedly proclaims its opposition to the infamous "university for all," but uses the phrase as something of a cover under which really to attack the "university for many and more." Interestingly, El Mercurio (Chile's leading daily, basically pro-government) continually reaffirms its opposition to the "university for all" partially as a protective shield for its questioning of the possible excesses of exclusion.[20]

In terms of socio-economic sectors, the broad ramifications of restricted admission are fairly clear. One may properly be skeptical of charges that the junta purposefully seeks to deprive the less fortunate sectors. But substituting of the previous governments' concern to incorporate more sectors with a now operationally "neutral" policy produces those results. Junta policies have unquestionably dealt a heavy blow to burgeoning efforts

to incorporate lower sectors. Many believe that working class families are presently less represented than even in 1964, but clearly their greatest incorporation took place in the late sixties and early seventies. The new reality is most clearly reflected in the abolishment of numerous technical schools, many associated with the National Technical University. Similarly, the implementation of stringent aptitude tests probably exacerbates differential access possibilities based on socio-economic status by imposing stringent objective criteria which wealthier students are generally better able to meet. These tests symbolize the effort to return to orderly selection based on academic merit rather than on reformist and politicized criteria. Thus, incidents of illegitimate political favoratism, while properly causing considerable public commotion, have certainly been less important in molding the junta's admission policy than the imposition of highly demanding "objective" criteria.

The key point is that stagnation, which means effective declines given increased secondary school graduates, surely excludes groups on the margin.[21] It is of course perfectly valid to maintain that -- short of a drastic infusion of "corrective" politicized criteria -- higher education must be exclusive where there is a very high correlation between socio-economic status and the minority who finish secondary school. In any case, the reassertion of a more elitist university clearly means continued exclusiveness for poorer groups and peremptory exclusion for recently mobilizing working class and lower middle sectors. But because the university was still overwhelmingly an institution for the middle class and upper middle class, the effects of exclusion, direct and peremptory, are felt most strongly in relatively priviledged sectors. The paradox is this: By severely regulating the size of the higher education system the junta makes that system itself more regressive, whereas, because higher education virtually always serves relatively privileged sectors, it may especially

frustrate those very sectors. We will, in fact, encounter many more examples of the anti-middle class effects of the regime's university policies. It is pertinent to consider how such policies compare to the stagnation now characterizing many non-authoritarian systems. The peremptory exclusion of marginal groups seems generalizable. In the authoritarian case, however, there may be a forceable exclusion of mobilized groups not voluntarily forfeiting their higher educational opportunities. Authoritarian policy may involve actual exclusion. Coercion, of course, is the key difference between the authoritarian and non-authoritarian stagnations. It could be argued that even non-BA regimes would have responded harshly to the unprecedented, perhaps unwarranted, growth of the early seventies. This overlooks at least two factors. The first is that the junta has reversed policies dating back to pre-U.P. years. There is indeed a rejection not just of the expansion inspired by revolutionary ideas but the expansion inspired by bourgeois ideas as well. (Naturally, this does not necessarily make it wrong.)[22] The intensity of the reaction inaugurated a degree of exclusion probably not found in any non-BA regimes. The second factor is that, by definition, BA regimes generally emerge precisely where there have been crises inspired by unprecedented mobilization; their primordial task is to end the crises by eradicating the causes. The Chilean junta believed that such mobilization had taken hold in higher education.

Admissions policy in Argentina, but not Brazil, has shown notable similarities to what has been discussed thus far. Argentine enrollments peak in 1976 at 475 thousand and then sharply decline (about 15%) to a little over 400 thousand in 1978.[23] Looking at the number of first year openings, 1973 and 1974 are the peak years, followed by declines in 1975 and 1976 and then a precipitous drop of more than 50% in 1977. In 1978 and 1979 the figures apparently stabilize, even recover a bit, but well

below the 1972 level; fewer than one of two aspirants gains access to the university in 1978.[24] As in Chile, government-run universities are explicitly reacting to "excess expansion."[25] Again there is the strong concern to diminish the size of the social-welfare sector. It is more difficult to gauge the extent to which exclusion by the Argentine junta marks a broader reaction to secular growth, because the regime is younger and because the peronist period had been preceded less by democratic than by authoritarian rule.[26]

By contrast, Brazil's admissions policies could hardly be called exclusionary. In fact, no other Latin American country experienced faster growth from 1965-1970.[27] At least three related factors seem to account for the difference. One is that Brazil was at a lower level of social development and that entrance requirements traditionally had been rather stringent, so that the pre-coup years did not witness the degrees of inclusive politics seen in Chile or Argentina; no one thought that hyper-mobilization had taken place in Brazilian higher education. Another is that the Brazilian junta has been much more expansionist and growth-oriented in outlook. Finally, the junta embarked on a two-tier policy within which undergraduate enrollments could mushroom while the government would concern itself more with the regulation of graduate education. It would meet political demands through undergraduate expansion and worry about rational economic policies only at the graduate level. The bulk of the growth was funnelled to proliferating private institutions (escolas isoladas), less out of an ideological preference for free enterprise than out of anxiety over multiplying official expenditures. Attempts to regulate and centralize the admissions process have met with mixed results.[28] It is possible to attribute both the junta's growth-oriented outlook and two-tier policy to the lack of great pre-coup mobilization. The "early" emergence of the BA allowed the regime to preside over, and even funnel, "still reasonable"

growth.

Brazilian enrollments increased from approximately 150 thousand in 1964 to nearly one million by 1975. Not even immediate post-coup policies showed the backlash characteristics found in Chile and Argentina. Until 1968 enrollments grew at an average of 14%/year (in comparison to 10% from 1954-1964).[29] Whatever the relation to the victory of the political "hard-liners" within the junta and the relaxation of "economic orthodoxy," growth accelerated to 27%/year between 1968 and 1972. Then, from 1972 and especially from 1975, more government officials began to have greater doubts about the advisability of unrestrained expansion.[30] From 1972-1977, average growth returned to about 15%/year. Similar patterns hold for first year openings (vagas). These did decline in 1965 but increased dramatically by 1967 and especially 1969, slowing since 1972.[31]

Personnel Selection

The general orthodoxy of university policies may be guaranteed by authoritarian control over personnel selection. The key is the decidedly hierarchical power structure headed by powerful rectors and ultimately the government itself. Indeed personnel selection can be understood largely in terms of such BA characteristics as the top-down state appointment of institutional leadership. This overturns the norms of community choice and election from below. The technocratic perspective is that these norms are disruptive and that administrators should be selected on rational bases. In addition, the BA system requires widespread dismissals partly to cut public expenditures, partly to quash dissent.

Chilean rectors have much greater discretion than before to appoint, assign, and -- most important of all -- fire professors.[32] It is difficult to gauge the number of expelled professors. Many were replaced, many became part-time and many left before they could be formally purged. The severity of the purges clearly varied across universities according to the

level of politicization achieved before the coup. Thus the initial purges struck hardest at the Technical University, a Communist stronghold, and at the University of Concepción, where the extreme left was probably strongest, and least at the Catholic universities, which had been basically anti-UP.[33] Severity likewise varied among faculties within universities.[34] It also varied, however, according to less patterned factors, such as the disposition of particular rectors or deans.

Not just political but political-economic factors explain the purges. Most of the early purges were fundamentally politically-based, but drastic financial cuts subsequently played a major role. The two factors are interwoven. The cuts themselves derived in part from the junta's penchant to diminish public expenditures; administrators often would then make the requisite personnel cuts according to political criteria. Thus the 1976 financial crisis in the Catholic University led to personnel cuts falling hard, for example, on social science institutes. Particularly important has been the widespread retreat from full to part-time instructors; within the latter category, many professionals who had devoted much of their time to the university now devote more to professional practice.

An inevitable consequence of the political-economy policy has been a severe brain drain. Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina (early on) and more developed nations have received forsaken Chilean talent. Apparently, the exodus has been more marked among young and middle-aged groups than among their older colleagues, who had generally been less involved in the Reform. The government's concern has been at best sporadic, partly due to a feeling (not unlike that of Castro's early years) that bad blood could be let. By 1977, however, the junta did grant salary increases greater than those prescribed for the public sector as a whole.[35] "Nationalism" would require not just allegiance but skilled human resources.

Turning from professors to administrative personnel, the bluntest

example of authoritarianism surely is the appointment of military officers as rectors. Within two weeks after the coup the junta pushed aside a unanimous proclamation by Chile's rectors that the universities should reorganize themselves and instead announced that a reconstituted ministry of education would direct the reorganization; the first step was the appointment of military rectors.[36]

One can only speculate as to why the government persists with so blatant a violation of legitimate norms, when like-minded civilians could be entrusted. Perhaps the junta fears that such a gesture would provide an opening for the Church to reassert its authority over rector-selection at the Catholic University. Until now, the University's Grand Chancellor, the Archbishop of Santiago, has "suspended" his university role, appointing a Pro-Grand Chancellor to substitute. Recently, however, the Church has informed the government that it intends to appoint the next rector of "its" University.

Heightened conflict over personnel policy at the Catholic University is especially serious for the government. For one thing, it involves relations with the Vatican itself. There is some chance that the Pope will explicitly support the Church's right to appoint the University's rector. Such matters may well be especially sensitive while the Vatican is officially mediating in the Chilean-Argentina land dispute. But even leaving aside the Vatican, the Catholic Church of Chile is a venerable, legitimate institution commanding wide respect. As we will see below, the government has been <u>relatively</u> more favorable to the Catholic University than to some others; in part this reflects Church authority, in larger part it reflects the University's concentration of anti-leftist technocrats and Chicago Boys. Church sympathy for theology students who were severely sanctioned for anti-government demonstrations brought relations between government and Church authorities to a new low. The military rector and

the Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez respectively expressed themselves unambiguously: "I believe that the ecclesiastical hierarchy has taken and demonstrated an anti-government position." "I do not believe that such an unjust, false, and disrespectful evaluation of the Church of Chile has ever been made by any rector of our University.[37]

For now, the appointment of civilian pro-rectors immediately beneath the rectors helped give some degree of academic continuity to the Chilean universities. Following the top-down pattern, vice-rectors are then assigned particular responsibilities. Ultimate authority remains with the rector. In comparison with the pre-coup university, much more control is exercised at the top level of the university structure. But this has not guaranteed automatic implementation of the government will. On the contrary, the military rectors often seem to have "donned the uniform" of their own university. Most have tried to maintain or improve the relative position of their universities within the system. Most are inevitably influenced by their deans and professors. Beyond this institutional identity, each rector is an officer of his branch of the armed forces. Rectors are subordinate not just to the ministry of education but to the head of their military service. As will be seen most clearly in financial policy, the "economic group" decries the continuation of politiquería in the universities -- now practiced by military rectors! The inter-university Council of Rectors, which had always suffered from centrifugal tendencies, still is unable to achieve nearly the degree of coordination expected of it. This remains true even after government imposition of the education minister as president (1976), a position hitherto occupied by the rector of the University of Chile.

An interesting case-study of the government's quest for control over personnel concerns the University of Chile in late 1975 into 1976.[38] Soon after the coup rightists had gained ascendency in the University, seeking

a "mutual non-aggression pact with the government."[39] Linz's notion of authoritarianism, in which some degree of autonomy may be left to sectors which do not challenge the government, may be relevant. Soon, however, the situation became untenable. For one thing, frictions developed between the air force, which ruled the University, and the army, which was increasingly dominant in the government. For another, Chile's biggest University is inherently difficult to rule from a single point atop the pyramid and more power had to be delegated to the deans, a less group than the rectors.

The first two military officers differed in ability but both were fairly sympathetic to the newly-entrenched authority of those right to center university elements with established anti-marxist credentials. When the government announced its financial reductions for 1976, to fall overwhelmingly on the University of Chile, these elements protested, and received their rector's support.[40] This provided the lever for Patria y Libertad, the extremist group, to press its demands for depuración. Realizing that it had not been enough merely to change rectors since these were partially "captured" by their subordinates, the government responded by imposing a rather brutish army general, hatchet in hand. The "earthquake" was underway. Until this point the University had mandated relatively few changes in its non-marxist personnel. Hours after assuming office, citing budgetary constraints but clearly bent on depuración, the new rector demanded wholesale resignations. Some were reappointed, others reassigned and others dismissed. Many who left felt that a majoritarian anti-U.P. movement had been betrayed: "Unfortunately, today, only certain minority sectors are considered genuine and faithful patriots."[41]

Some sense of "normalcy" has returned since 1976 in the aftermath of a major national scandal. The scandal developed when one of the anti-U.P., anti-purge professors produced evidence of gross improprieties in admissions.

Naturally he was fired, but so was the rector. The new rector was the first actively serving general, perhaps a recognition of the undeniable importance of the University of Chile. He was also a personal confidant of President Pinochet. One could hypothesize a certain inverse relationship between autonomy and strength. Losing much of what still remained of the first, the University could now recover a bit of the second.[42] A further speculation is that the 1976 purges may indicate some inclination to go beyond Linz's "guiding mentalities" toward insistence on ideological righteousness in Chile's authoritarian system.

The relative relaxation that characterized personnel policy for the subsequent three-year period was sharply reversed in December, 1979. Extensive new purges occurred.[43] As before, some involved actual dismissal, others demotion to part-time status. Also as before, most were justified in economic terms, pursuing "administrative rationalization." It was again clear, however, that political factors were operating. These purges did not accompany the same sort of drastic financial cuts seen in 1974 or 1976. The singurlarly most revealing case concerned the dismissal of Manuel Sanhueza, after thirty-two years as professor at the University of Concepción. Sanhueza was President of the "Group of 24," the chief national forum of democratic opposition to the regime. The University's new rector, just appointed to effect the purges, frankly acknowledged that economics were irrelevant to the decision, praised Sanhueza's academic record, but affirmed that the junta simply could not permit the presence of dissidents. Most observers interpreted the "1980 mission" of the government as a renewed "clean-up" aimed at renewed "purity" in reaction to recent tendencies. The government was manifestly preoccupied by the extent to which talk of <u>apertura</u> (opening up) had spread throughout society, particularly in the universities. This new purge is strong evidence that <u>repressive higher education policy is not simply a one-stroke initial backlash</u> characterizing

only the immediate post-coup period.

In general terms, similar tendencies toward vertical control can be found in Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Brazil. Rectors are appointed by the government. The rectorship becomes more powerful than before, with, for example, greater authority to name other personnel.[44] At least the rectors are civilians, however. Furthermore, government appointment actually preceded military rule (except for Argentina's democratic period 1958-1966). The difference appears to be analogous to that between traditional coups and the recent tendency toward extended rule: previously when rectors went too far the ministry fired them and then returned considerable control to the new rectors; today it maintains a greater ongoing presence.[45] In Brazil, lists of candidates are still proposed from the university itself, though within greater constraints.

In Argentina, as in Chile, there has been friction between the ministry and the principal university. Neither the ministers nor the rectors have achieved stability, thus leaving unresolved a pre-coup obstacle to coherent policy-making.[46] The Council of Rectors for the public universities has remained ineffective. Much more than in Chile, leadership problems reflect a notable lack of consensus on what university policy should be. Thus there is less construction of a new order than there is plain repression. Purges again have a political-economic rationale: fire the dissidents, cut the inflated budget. There is a similarly strong feeling that many professors had been "improvised" for purely political reasons in the pre-coup years. Purges have also figured prominently in Brazilian policy but, by comparison, the situation has substantially normalized to the point where Brazil even benefits, through migration, from others' purges.

An important distinction must be introduced into generalizations about personnel policy in Argentina and Brazil. The private sector -- unlike its counterpart in Chile -- functions differently from the public sector,

There is much more autonomy from government in the selection and firing of administrators and professors. Private institutions often became sanctuaries for personnel purged from the public sector. Possibly the government does not crave or cannot secure blanket control; possibly the legal guarantees of the private sector conserve some force. It is especially ironic that many liberal Argentine professors who had battled so hard against the creation of a "reactionary" private sector (in the late fifties) should be saved by it twenty years later, just as others had been ten years later.

Academic Policy

"Academic policy" provides something of a catch-all category within which to consider two important aspects of policy not yet covered. Student participation, on the policy formation side, and curricular requirements, on the output side, seem to be relatively unambiguous qualitative examples of regime behavior. Political exclusion characterizes the suppression of student participation and of academic freedom more generally. The state's power is greatly augmented through imposition of its own technocratic notions of educational efficiency and even ideological notions of nationalism. Implementation of these notions undoes the major achievements of the Reform.

As O'Donnell notes, the repression of students and intellectuals occurs immediately after the coup. Democratic expressions of strength, such as elections, mobilization, protests and strikes must be banished, especially where these create alliances with the popular sectors.[47] And Chilean student politics had developed a vitality rarely matched in historical or comparative experience. Student movements were integrally tied to national political movements and parties. Again we see the pattern of dramatically heightened activity in the pre-coup years. The Reform granted far greater rights to students, but even expanding institutional outlets could not possibly tame accelerated mobilization. Partisan strife reached major proportions.[48]

The junta would have to end what it perceived as the politiquería of constant electioneering, strikes, community action or, in short, the attitude that the student's role encompassed more than just academic study. Allende himself had admonished students that their most effective revolutionary contribution would be to gain and apply knowledge, but he had not "effectively controlled" even his supporters.[49] (The parallel to uncontrolled worker activities is striking.)[50] Again the military's reaction logically seems to have been most severe in the most politicized universities.[51]

Basically, the junta has forbidden previous forms of student expression. No meetings may take place without the express authorization of the relevant dean. Nor may students prepare, publish, post or distribute written materials.[52] Remaining, even officially stimulated, are bread and circus activities: dances, concerts, and sports events are billed as student participation. Former student "organizations" give way to social student "centers." Leadership selection has predictably followed a corporatist form. Pre-coup elected leaders lost their posts, to be replaced by students in confidence. Leaders are selected, on the basis of personal and moral attributes, by the rector, or by rectors from lists proposed by vice-rectors or by existing student leaders. Only through these designated leaders may students communicate with university administrations.

The junta has also tried to build new, distinctly corporatist structures. Some such structures were created soon after the coup. But recently, in tandem with controversial official efforts to create new sindicatos for workers, efforts to create institutionalizing student structures have been intensified. One view is that the government is responding to increased pressures from below, that it sees some risk involved in action but more in inaction; another view is that the government is building upon a position of secure strength.[53]

It is instructive to trace the genesis of student sindicatos in a given university.[54] Late in 1978, suddenly and swiftly, the first few institutionalizing stages took the Catholic University student body quite by surprise. The president of the student organization (FEUC) submitted a project which received quick approval from the presidents of student centers in the various faculties. The rector's approval made it official. What are the characteristics of the new institutionalization? The outgoing student president praised a "perfect system of indirect democracy."[55] He argued that it combines "representative democracy and depoliticization." Unlike the pre-coup FEUC, it would avoid the divisive pitfall of "petty politics;" it would be apolitical but antimarxist; it would give students an institutionalized voice but not vote: "participación sí, co-gobierno no." Dissident groups described the new institutionalization differently: "The new student organization has been imposed on the universitarios and in it the students play more the part of objects than subjects."[56] The new student organization continues to depend fundamentally on the university administration, specifically the academic vice-rector, although there possibly is wider latitude for student officials to select other student officials. Similarly, the government has argued for a "liberty of association," in which no student would be forced to join a given, central organization. Students charge that this is akin to the government's divide and conquer labor policy, denying sindicatos the strength achieved through organizational solidarity.

Many students have expressed their outrage actively. Hundreds of Católica students have participated in "lightening" demonstrations. Chants of "student liberty" accompanied by rhythmic clapping led officials to respond that while anyone could dissent, "delirious gatherings" could not be tolerated. In turn, the expulsion of two students led to formal protests by the student center of the Faculty of Theology.[57] Ultimately, the appeals

failed and most student centers backed the rector's hard line. But one should not underestimate the incidents of bold student protest since 1973. As Schmitter has pointed out for Brazil, the government can guaranteee its corporatist student organization many things -- but not legitimacy.[58]

The first case in which Chilean students were permitted a chance at legitimate elections proved quite embarrassing to the government. For the first time in six years, University of Chile students could elect their own delegates. Perhaps fifteen to thirty per cent obstained. Of those who voted, less than thirty per cent supported candidates of the official association, tied to the university administration. Over seventy per cent explicitly rejected those candidates or voted independent.[59]

The drastic counter-reform in participatory policy-making has had its parallel in a counter-reform in the content of educational policy. We will proceed to consider the evidence of discriminatory human resource policy according to fields of research. It may well be, however, that qualitative changes <u>within</u> fields are more significant than quantitative changes across fields. Obviously, curricular changes are greatest in the more ideologically-oriented areas. The Catholic University still teaches "sociology," but not like before. The University of Chile's Faculty of Economics, once terribly split along ideological grounds, now demands allegiance to free-market models. The University's Law School closed its department of social science as it returned basically to the pre-Reform plan of studies which emphasized assimilation of factual material much more than the development of critical abilities.[60] In the arts, free creativity has been curtailed though not abolished. Furthermore, networks of university extension courses and activities have been terminated. Especially noteworthy are many joint programs between the National Technical University and the central labor union (CUT). Critics charge that the "Universidad Comprometida" has once again become the "Universidad Ajena."

The "no frills" approach to university education demands rigid discipline and standards. Students must be preoccupied with memorization and exams. High attendance rates are compulsory. Curriculum flexibility has given ground to required tracks. Gone are reformist attempts to make curriculum more relevant to students' anxieties and interests. Critical thought and spontaneity have suffered. Real doubts arise as to whether the universities are "universities" or "institutes." Many claim already to see the toll on student character: harsh requirements have bred docility.[61] They see an insufferable decline in academic quality, aggravated by the substitution of incapable or political personnel for trained professionals. Some of these same observers concede possible gains in certain indicators of quality: more devotion to study, less to political activity, lower drop-out rates, tougher admissions exams, strides in applied research, diminished bureaucratic inefficiencies in university administration.

What emerges, in the view of many, is a return to the pre-Reform university model -- the "professional university" (universidad profesionalizante). Instead of a university for change, we see a university rededicated to a conservative society. The primary task once again is the training of professional elites. Curriculum and research focus on the practical and applied, factually presented rather than critically assessed. Fewer professors devote full or half time to teaching, re-emphasizing instead their professional practices. The university community loses some of its distinctive character. Students are once again from the more privileged sectors, for recycling into those sectors. Other observers maintain that the contemporary university is a reversion to the "modernizing university." By the 1950s, they argue, research became a major activity and increasing emphasis was placed on the application of knowledge apart from simply traditional professional activity. Rather

than posing these two viewpoints in a mutually exclusive way, one can conclude that both have considerable validity. The contemporary university reverts to certain characteristics of previous models, blending them however, into something new. Much has been relegated to narrow professional training while much has been reworked to satisfy a technocratic modernization model based on "dependent" integration into the world system.[62] In any case, it is clear that the contemporary university represents a change far more drastic than a simple undoing of perceived pre-coup excesses.

Argentina has seen a similarly harsh repression of student participation. Former organizations are prohibited as are all sorts of political activities. As in Chile, the new posture makes for a thorough reversal of the pre-coup politicization. Argentina, in fact, boasts a strong tradition of student participation dating back to its historic Córdoba reforms (1918), although periodic repression has marred the record. What thus far separates Argentina from Chile is the lack of comparable efforts at building corporate structures to institutionalize the new order. Similarly in curriculum policy, Argentina is broadly parallel to Chile in terms of the destruction of previous patterns, emphasis on docility, and lack of critical orientation, but with probably less dynamic reorientation toward new goals. The important qualification is that certain private universities have maintained a greater degree of autonomy in setting academic standards than have Chilean universities, private or public.

Comparison with Brazil depends largely on our time reference. In the sixties, particularly in the late sixties, student organizations were harshly repressed. By late in the seventies, limits to organization were still in place, but there was considerable leeway for expression, even protest. Attempts to build official corporate organizations had failed. Student politics were among the most open within the general "opening up" occurring in Brazil's political system. Similarly, an evaluation of

curricular policy depends on our time reference. Harsh "Institutional Acts" and "national security" doctrines have been relaxed. There is a good deal more freedom in the classroom than in the Brazil of a decade ago or in contemporary Argentina and Chile. One difficulty in making such broad assessments is that the Brazilian government has traditionally, even before the 1964 coup, maintained a heavy hand in academic affairs.

Human Resource Policy

While the most dramatic change in Chile's human resource policy has been effected through purges and exclusionary admissions policies, the regime has also reshapen the university's basic work tasks. Key areas are undergraduate fields of student study and fields of research. Clearly, the university must be reoriented to the new economic model. The University of Chile's first military rector declared that the nation must do away with careers that "deceive" youth by encouraging disruptive political ideology or offering little prospect of gainful employment; instead, the university must be coordinated with the nation's new technical and professional needs.[63] A greatly diminished welfare sector, for example, obviously reduces the demand for social scientists and for related research.

Data on changed enrollments by careers may not provide the most appropriate indicators of regime policy. First, the junta's reign is still too brief to have significantly affected enrollments in the advanced years.[64] Then too, percentage enrollments in previously neglected fields had risen under the relatively non-coercive policies of the DC era. Analysis of changes in careers grouped according to "favorable," "unfavorable," and "neutral" does not reveal statistically significant differences from 1973-1977.[65] It is revealing, however, that social sciences have fallen most sharply (25% as opposed to 10% for total enrollments). While some trends are patterned, others are erratic. At

the Universities of Chile and Concepción social sciences are clearly the biggest losers, but law increases proportionally at the former and decreases at the latter.[66] Much has to do with the degree of mobilization in given careers in given sites and with whether subsequent military authorities revamped or simply cut.

A more sensitive indicator of regime policy is the prescribed cupo of first year offerings by career. Here changes are dramatic indeed. From 1974 to 1977 the total cupo fell 22% while social sciences fell 49%.[67] Particular cases may show the extreme. The University of Concepción reduced its social science cupo to a mere 2% by 1977; many schools were transferred (e.g., economics and administration from the Area of Social Sciences to the Area of Physics, Chemistry and Natural Sciences; some schools, strongholds of the MIR, were simply eradicated (sociology and journalism).[68] Political science is gone in the Catholic University and the University of Chile. In general, the junta has wielded its axe most freely against careers associated with radical politics, new careers established during the Reform, and careers in new regional campuses. Backlash cuts against recent mobilization are thus qualitative as well as quantitative. They may cut overall enrollments by striking at the most vulnerable and in some cases academically inferior careers. They may also scuttle efforts at innovation, curricular flexibility, social change, and broader socio-economic participation.

In research policy, the chief characteristics have been reductions, special disfavoring of pure and social science research, and increased centralized control. The fate of Chile's National Council on Science and Technology is instructive. Created under the DC to promote national research, it declined under the U.P. possibly due to a lack of government direction, possibly to researchers' mistrust of the government, and possibly to rampant politicization (reflected, for example, in the

parcelling out of positions by quota to different political parties). But those Council members who expected better times were sadly mistaken. The Council's governing board was placed in recess and its dependency shifted from educational to economic sectors of the government and to the President himself. Many in the influential "economic group" malign "structuralist" visions of development, suggesting instead that the laws of international economy and competitive advantage dictate that Chile buy "front-line" science and technology. DC and UP concern for national economic independence has lost out. "Ideological" or not, a basic government idea is simply to cut costs in the short-run. Other short-run results are equally clear. El Mercurio bemoans the price of the brain drain: "The exodus of quality teachers and researchers from Chilean universities is not dealt with by rhetorical statements nor laments."[69] Many deans have resigned in direct or indirect protest.

Pure research and social science research suffer most harshly. They are considered either insufficiently useful or downright negative in their results. Instead, there is a relative increase in applied research, often contracted with government or private enterprise. Clear priority goes to engineering and biology; scholars fear for the very survival of social science research.[70]

These discriminatory policies are most clearly seen where centralized control has gone furthest, as in the Catholic University and the University of Concepción more than in the University of Chile. The Catholic University's central Office of Research already captures about twice the share of the University's budget that it did before the coup.[71] The University of Concepción has centralized nearly all its research monies in a central office; but Chile's biggest University still funnels most of its monies through the faculties. Again Reform programs, such as interdisciplinary research, have lost out, but the biggest losers are the individual professors,

who now have far less power to choose research topics. And the competition for central monies is tough, governed by rigid priorities. When broken down by fields of research, the percentage of centrally-funded projects in the social and human sciences is extremely low.[72] Consequences of revamped research policies are very severe since upwards of 90% of total national research has been conducted within the universities.

The human resource profile in Argentina seems to lack the sense of direction seen in Chile. There is the same anti-social science policy, abolishing careers and research centers (formally among the region's best). There is also the strong parochialism against innovative courses. But the preoccupation seems to be to cut more than re-orient enrollments.[73] There are, however, firm annual quotas by field of study so that trends may crystallize. Similarly, the crackdown on research has been severe overall, especially severe in some fields, but not clearly part of a new plan. Now more directly under the control of the President than education officials, Argentina's National Science and Technology Council has been allocating very little for social science. Officials base their anti-research bias on the allegedly politicized and shoddy work that had passed for research, and of course on the costs. Again there is a strong current favoring the importation of front-line knowledge but also a definite concern about the brain drain.

In Brazil, government control mixes with human resource expansion to produce a different picture. Apparently there was some early inclination to implement government priorities pre-dating the coup to reduce the great proportions in traditional careers, and then even impose a technocratic system. Soon, however, it became clear that the growing social demand for higher education was a political force to be placated. As most demand was absorbed by small private schools lacking sufficient resources, demand has been funnelled into inexpensive fields such as law and social

science. So although the military's national security doctrine had important negative consequences for the social sciences, Brazil has not seen rigid quotas by fields of study at the undergraduate level.

Greater control is found at the graduate level.[74] Research too is characterized by both control and expansion. The latter sets Brazil off sharply from its neighbors. Brazil's National Science and Technology Council is probably Latin America's most powerful and vibrant. Even the social sciences today are receiving relatively good government support, certainly compared to the early years (when only foreign endowments may have saved them while the government favored harder and applied sciences almost exclusively); many even argue that the situation is better than pre-1964, when there was very little money for research and national councils traditionally discriminated against the social sciences.[75] It comes as little surprise then that Brazil benefits from a brain gain from Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. This is not to overlook very strong pockets within Brazil's official circles that prefer to import science and technology. In fact, the tension between "internationalists" and "nationalists" in this repsect has been a central one. Different agencies may pursue contradictory policies. But, at least in contrast to the rest of the Southern Cone, the nationalists have carried the day. To offer an oversimplified summary contrast of government research policy in the Cone's three major nations: Chile has cut and centralized strong control within individual universities which are themselves strongly controlled by the government; Argentina has cut, and apparently stagnated; Brazil has expanded while concentrating the research allocation function in centralized agencies which are subjected to more explicit control than the universities.[76]

Financial Policy

Proper skepticism of predicting quantitative policy outputs notwithstanding, some assumptions seem as reasonable in finance as they did in admissions. While either increases or decreases are compatible with authoritarian regime policy, decreases might be more representative of post-coup BA policy. The logic derives from regime preoccupation to demobilize, cut social-welfare expenditures, control inflation and attract foreign capital. Thus it is early in the post-coup period, when counter-revolutionary fervor and economic orthodoxy run rampant, that sever cut-backs might predictably occur.[77]

Immediately after its coup, the Chilean military prescribed shock treatment for the economy. Inflation, perhaps soaring toward 1000%/year in 1973, would be attacked primarily by cutting social-welfare expenditures. The government argued that drastic measures were necessary in higher education, and would actually cause relatively little harm, because of the excesses of the previous period. These included an irresponsible proliferation of enrollments, personnel, shoddy research, course offerings and regional campuses. Government economists claimed, for example, that one fourth of all courses had only one to ten students, and nearly another fourth had only 11-20.[78] They argued that tuition should replace subsidies since the "price" for university education was obviously too low when too many opted for university education only to graduate without suitable employment. Again, many officials attacked not only UP policies but a long-developing tradition of Chilean "socialism": far too much activity had been conducted through the public sector. Thus there was some explicit effort via reduced subsidies and increased tuitions at the "privatization" of public institutions. Only through subsidy cuts could efficiency be attained. In fact, pro-junta economists complained that even the military rectors would not crack-down on waste unless forced to by tight budgets!

Likewise, students would more likely be responsible and finish their degree requirements promptly if they themselves were paying.[79]

Whatever the consequences for efficiency, it is fairly clear that the government is bent on cutting its expenditures on higher education. Far more debatable is the government's professed concern to redistribute resources progressively. It cites the low percentage of poorer students who ever graduate secondary school, and higher education's astounding pre-coup share of the national education budget. Even secondary schools may be relatively regressive in terms of student composition. "Chile is not Brazil," some argue in asserting that the Chilean attack on "extreme poverty" is genuine. Increased subsidies to higher education are denounced as part of an overall pattern of welfare for the upper middle class. Subsidization has responded to political pressure, mounted by privileged clientele and media control, and not to the dictates of socio-economic justice. In 1974, for example, greater than 40% of the federal education budget went to fewer than 5% of the students.[80] In no uncertain terms, as revealed also in admissions cutbacks, reductions are a powerful blow to the middle sectors. Exceptions aside, the university has been their institution. O'Donnell's analysis of the pre-coup conditions which breed "more complete subordination of most middle sectors" is especially relevant here.[81] Thus the government's claim that it is reorienting expenditures in favor of the lower levels, especially pre-school.

The entire rationale is vintage Chicago Boys. It is an excellent example of how their ideology meshes perfectly with the government's less sophisticated political-economic impulses. The Chicago Boys prepared themselves before the coup and were ready to offer their services immediately to a military new at rulership, lacking the sort of preparation that the Peruvian and Brazilian militaries had before their coups.[82]

It is often said that Chile's Chicago Boys are more papist than the Pope. They represent a very important ideological transfer from more developed to less developed nations. The nucleus comes from the Catholic University, which in the 1960's undertook agreements and interchanges with the University of Chicago, elevating the stature of the Catholic's economics program enormously.[83] Within the government sector pertaining to higher education, the new economic group has been prominent in Finance, ODEPLAN and Education. Some economists officially work for the government, others are key advisors.[84]

The consequent changes made in the financing of higher education have been striking, though far less so than the Chicago Boys have wanted. Tuition, while still very low by U.S. standards, is substantial by comparison with traditional taboos, or, indeed, the monthly minimum wage. Different methods are in effect to offset the burden on less wealthy students. The two most prominent are relative exemptions (e.g. University of Chile) and scholarships or loans (e.g. Catholic University) based largely on family income. Officials at the Catholic University, for example, are proud of their data processing aimed at implementing fair criteria. It is too early to tell how far the tuition policy will be carried. The initial failure to implement tuition-financed higher education, as the government proclaimed in 1974, would constitute a fascinating case-study of junta decision-making. Suffice it here to note that political opposition played a role, particularly as military rectors fought hard against policies unpopular within their "constitutencies."[85] Thus far the regime has had more success in making all its universities more "public" by increasing government control than in making all more "private" by imposing tuition.

Nonetheless, contrary to what many thought, the tuition push has not died. Although the government failed in its resolve to freeze subsidies from 1977-1980, as the new decade dawned, the Chicago Boys were reasserting various

plans to apply their economic principles to higher educational finance. One possibility is to tie subsidy increments only to inflation so that any university seeking to expand or improve would have to attract its own income; the officially-advocated method would be markedly increased tuitions, payable through loans. The self-financed proportion of university income has already gone up notably, mostly due to a near freeze on subsidies. From 1965-1974 the average annual percentage of income that the universities themselves generated was 12.1% but from 1976-1978 it was 21.9%.[86]

Indicator after indicator would show pretty much the same junta subsidization pattern: drastic backlash cuts wiping out UP highs and DC trends, followed by stabilization, or even relative recovery. Table 1 presents the raw data. Higher education's share of the respective national and education budgets dropped from 6.2% (1974) to 4.6% (1976) to 5.4% (1978) and 41% (1974) to 32% (1976) to 36% (1978). Education's share of the national budget has followed a similar but much less dramatic pattern. Comparisons with public expenditures tend to underplay the degree of austerity because the public sector overall has diminshed.[87] Nor can the junta's cuts be accounted for simply by reference to national economic weakness since the higher education/GNP ratio also dropped dramatically in 1975-1977 relative to 1972-1974. Relative recuperation by 1978 apparently stems from a calming of the ideologically-charged backlash of the early years. UP expansion had been effectively undone. Another explanation is that the government was prepared to support financially a system over which it now had more solid control. Alternatively, it may well be that the universities naturally regain some of their former political power to solicit funds. It is doubtful that the government could freeze salaries while the economy grows; it granted a special salary boost subsidy in 1977 in part acknowledging the dangers of a continuing brain drain.

TABLE 1

CHILE: PERCENTAGE EXPENDITURES

YEAR	Ed/GNP	Ed/Budget	HE/GNP	HE/Budget	HE/Ed
1965	3.2	13.1	0.9	3.9	29.6
1966	3.4	13.9	1.0	4.1	29.3
1967	3.4	15.2	1.0	4.3	28.3
1968	3.6	15.8	1.0	4.6	29.2
1969	3.6	14.8	1.1	4.5	30.3
1970	3.8	14.2	1.2	4.4	30.5
1971	4.8	15.4	1.5	4.9	31.8
1972	5.2	17.9	1.9	6.5	36.1
1973	3.9	13.7	1.6	5.4	39.8
1974	4.8	15.2	2.0	6.2	40.9
1975	4.1	15.7	1.4	5.2	33.3
1976	3.9	14.4	1.2	4.6	31.8
1977	3.9	15.6	1.5	5.3	34.1
1978	---	14.8	---	5.4	36.2

Key: Ed = national education budget; budget - total national budget; h.e. - national higher education budget

Source: Ministerio de Hacienda, "Análisis financiero de la educación superior chilena," Santiago, 1978, pp. 3-8.

The key to the "recovery", however, is found most poignantly in a fusion between financial and admissions policies. If we set higher education expenditures/student at 100 in 1965, the index hits 137 in 1974, drops precipitously to 102 in 1976 and then rebounds to a high of 146 by 1978.[88] The government supports exclusionary universities. In fact, many officials hope to build academic excellence by maximizing the subsidy/student ratio. This authoritarian admissions-funding relationship is fundamentally different from that in which governments that do not themselves fix student numbers allocate funds according to those numbers.

As with admissions, subsidies follow a discriminatory policy across universities which indicates an interesting pattern of varying behavior within regime policy. The rationale behind systemic cuts, for example, is more potently relevant to some universities than others. The University of Chile and the Catholic University offer one revealing contrast. The junta's financial policies have been harsh on each of these universities, but relatively harsher on the University of Chile and relatively milder on the Catholic University. The former's share of government higher education expenditures, which had remained fairly steady under the UP, dropped while the Catholic's increased.[89] Obviously these differences follow to some extent the government's admissions policies. Among the possible causes of the University of Chile's fate are: the high degree of pre-coup mobilization in terms of both enrollments (increased numbers plus more inclusive socio-economic composition, especially in the regional campuses) and activism, the explicit marxist threat (though the DC generally was stronger), and the post-coup difficulty in controlling the nation's biggest University (especially until 1976). The Catholic Univeristy's relative advantages have included: a traditionally more pronounced socio-economic elitism, which contributed to the lesser pre-coup mobilization in terms just cited (to the point where the University actually was a major center of

opposition to the UP), some disposition not to antagonize unduly the University's privileged constituency or the Church, the fact that the Navy controls both the Ministry of Education and the University, the powerful "young-boy" ("lolocracia") ties between the University's Chicago Boys and the government, and the greater ease of centralizing control over research and curriculum.[90] Thus some factors refer more to the regime's genesis and composition, others more to diverse contextual matters related to regime control. It is less a matter of distinguishing between regime and other determinants of policy than of understanding how they blend. The logic of the BA imposes some tendencies (rather than inevitabilities) which vary not just across regimes but across and within given policy areas.

As with certain other issues the Chilean pattern shows far more similarities to Argentine than Brazilian patterns. From 1970-1975 Argentina's Ministry of Education captured between 11% and 16% of the national budget. In 1976 its percentage plummetted nearly in half, to 6.9%.[91] Higher education suffered even more sharply. Given certain conditions, some authoritarian regimes may well defy the extant hypothesis in higher education policy that sunk costs prevent sudden cuts. Expectedly, there was partial recovery by 1978. And despite pro-tuition expressions, the government has not undertaken anything like the tuition effort seen (immediately) in post-coup Chile. Most of the factors impeding Chile's implementation are relevant here; one might add that the government itself is less united, especially on economic policy, and that it has had less time. An obviously relevant fact is the existence in Argentina of a more truly private sector than Chile has; Argentina's private institutions get virtually no direct funding from the government, while its public institutions derive nearly all their funding from it. Still, about 85% of enrollments are in the public sector.[92]

As one would expect from Brazil's expanding admissions policy, financial cuts have <u>not</u> been characteristic. On the contrary, higher education's share

of the national budget jumped markedly in 1965 and has more or less maintained itself.[93] The government has made some very halting attempts to impose tuition, especially with the creation of fundações (institutions more decentralized from the government), but without success. However, the public-private distinction takes on greater significance. The private sector has absorbed most of the recent enrollment growth so that it now captures nearly 65% of the total. While the better privates do receive some official subsidies, most are escolas isoladas, of poor quality do not. The private sector has been a safety valve, shielding the government from greater financial burdens--or perhaps the political burden of imposing tuition on the public institutions. Even if we suppose similar regimes, contextual factors such as the pre-existence of dual or unitary sectors will lead to diverse policy outcomes.

Summary: By Contrasts to Mexico

Recent literature on the Mexican regime has emphasized many fundamental similarities to authoritarian sister republics. Allowing for substantially less overt repression, it focuses on the regime's power and autonomy; the regime basically shapes and controls, rather than responds to, societal demands. Broader theories of authoritarianism and corporatism have likewise assimilated the Mexican case.[94] O'Donnell recognizes that important differences stem from the fact that the Mexican BA emerged before inclusive politics could get too far; therefore the regime has been able to tackle the dual challenges of political order and economic growth by maintaining what I have called "exclusiveness," without necessary recourse to more active "exclusion."[95] But if early emergence causes some differences in the "working and social impacts" of the Mexican regime, the BA classification is still thought to apply as the regime is the fundamentally independent variable in policy-making.[96]

I seek here to compare very briefly what in reality are markedly non-BA patterns of policy-making in Mexican (public) higher education to the patterns so far discussed especially for Chile.[97] I will refer to all five sub-policies cited in the introduction. One plausible conclusion is that widely different policies are possible within the BA. Another is that Mexico may deviate substantially from the BA ideal type. Either possibility may be derived from Mexico's "early" (and continuous) establishment of non-democratic rule. What seems clear is that Mexican policy-making in higher education is better characterized by a reconciliation than a BA model. Thus Mexico presents sharply illuminating contrasts to Chile. These contrasts provide an indirect way to summarize this study's findings.

BA admissions policy is characterized as decidedly exclusionary. The administration of drastic cut-backs is implemented by the government, according to stiff academic criteria. Admissions policy in Mexico is characterized by great expansion -- despite government concern over consequently soaring expenditures. The university, not the government, controls the admissions process, but actually there is little explicit institutional control of any kind. Roughly 90% of secondary school graduates enter higher education, generally unencumbered by demanding exams. Although the National University (UNAM) declines proportionally in its share of system enrollments, it still expands greatly in absolute terms. The government can only weaken it indirectly, through the expansion of its state systems, but insofar as students continue to prefer the more prestigious UNAM, the government's effects are limited; much the same can be said of the government's financial policies. Thus, admissions policies are not exclusionary. How much they are exclusive (due to the socio-economic determinants of who finishes secondary school) or actually inclusive (due to great expansion) depends on one's operationalization of those terms. State power is hardly manifested in the admission process. Rather, middle class and even lower middle class

socio-political demands have relatively free reign.

Unregulated choice carries over to selections of fields of study. Only in medicine are there serious restrictions. Nor does the government manage to reward and sanction universities (either across institutions or time) that achieve more and less favorable distributions. Even orientation guidelines are hard for the student to come by, despite demonstrable government priorities. There are efforts to orient research toward applied and natural sciences but these operate, with only limited success, mostly through extra-university councils. Research remains principally within the university, controlled in the individual faculties, with enviable degrees of researcher freedom to choose topics and methods. Not surprisingly, then, Mexico enjoys a brain gain from Chile and Argentina. The image of a central authority shaping demands and functions finds little support in Mexico's higher education's human resource policies. This obviously contrasts to the BA pattern of regime control, proscription, and implementation of its political-economic biases for certain types of study and research.

BA policy includes strong control over personnel selection. The government appoints rectors who then assume very great authority within a hierarchical university structure. Political-economic criteria, ideological and budgetary, are employed to reduce the number of professors. By contrast, power swirls not only in top-down, but bottom-up, and horizontal directions in most Mexican universities. Rectors are generally selected by a hybrid university-government process, usually inclined heavily to the former side. The rector's powers are substantial but so are the faculties' and even students'. Many administrators are freely elected, and while such political activity does not reach the proportions found in pre-coup Chile, it is substantial. Government encouragement of interuniversity coordination has lacked muscle and therefore has had only minimal success. Professors are hired through some combination of open competitions, faculty designation, and rector and

dean influence. Their numbers necessarily increase to meet enrollment, and they represent divergent political tendencies; "purges" would be the exception not the rule (most often occurring under more repressive state governments). Thus, government power is decidedly limited, in comparative terms, in personnel selection.

In Chile, Argentina, and Brazil in the sixties, academic freedoms were severely curtailed. Existing student organizations were destroyed, in some cases replaced by corporatist organizations tied to the authorities and proscribed from political expression. Curriculum and methods have been strictly monitored, to the detriment of criticism and innovation, and even to the point of requiring indoctrination. The limits to academic freedoms in Mexico apply principally to student organization beyond the campus. Thus active repression is applied only when the threat is rather direct, though it naturally exerts an omnipresent restrictive influence. Generally, however, there is comparatively wide latitude for free and critical expression, even protest. Many student organizations are quite independent, others are more corporatively tied to the dominant party (PRI). Student power has guaranteed lax exam and attendance requirements. In fact, there is very little government authority to demand economic efficiencies. The content and methods of instruction generally are determined within the university. Finally, considerable diversity of ideological orientation exists, certainly including marxism. In sum, compared to its Southern Cone counterparts, the Mexican regime has exerted very little control over the freedoms or academic activities of its universitarios. It has had a lesser role in making academic policy and that policy has been markedly different.

As this overview of Mexican higher education policies indicates, the university is more autonomous from government than the government is from societal demands -- notwithstanding official subsidization of far greater than 90% of public university income. A potentially coercive resource

monopoly sometimes appears more like a cumbersome and onerous responsibility. There are specific manifestations of the limits of government power within financial policy itself. Sustained government advocacy of greater university self-financing (backed by sporatic attempts at imposition) has failed dramatically.[98] The official rationale for self-financing is familiar, particularly concerning the need to curtail government expenditures. The failure to this point is a clear tribute to the political strength of the university and its middle-class constituents. In fact, subsidies continue to soar, reflecting higher education's growing share of the federal education budget and overall budget. And, revealingly, the subsidies increase regardless of university performance on at least a number of quantifiable measures, such as the extent of student disorders. It is even possible to discover predictable, linear growth patterns over time and across universities. Subsidies to individual universities are virtually never cut in absolute terms, and only rarely in real terms. Such policies form a spectacular contrast to Chile's horror story of sudden slashing cuts, often imposed especially harshly against particular institutions.

Conclusions

Focussing particularly on Chile, the central research task here has been to learn more about the politics of higher education under an important type of authoritarian regime. Empirical findings have taken on greater meaning when analyzed by reference to broader political patterns, patterns generally associated with the BA regime type. The central contribution of this article to the comparative education literature, then, lies in understanding policies within their borader political context.

Admissions policies are marked by forcible cut-backs, including even the coercive exclusion of groups previously mobilized into the system. Personnel policies are marked by repressive top-down control and fearful

purges of dissidents. Academic policies include the replacement of both established student participation and the open interchange of critical ideas, with mandated obedience. Human resource policies direct teaching and research away from fields that do not fit newly-imposed technocratic models. Finally, financial policies are part of an overall design to cut public social welfare expenditures. All these policies have a strong backlash component, undoing accelerated antithetic policies in the immediate pre-coup period; but most also go well beyond that period to undo longer-term policies and to seek a new order.

If, primarily, the nature of the political regime has informed our understanding of policy, surely specific policy analysis concretizes broader concepts about the political regime. Chilean higher education policy provides a case-study in BA policy-making. There is no need here to reiterate the dangers of deterministically linking regime type to policy.[99] That such a direct link need not exist is underscored by the difference in higher education policy found among regimes often categorized as BA. Argentina appears to follow similar policies to Chile in terms of pure repression and cut-backs, but to lack the same relatively sure sense and/or ability to decide how to build a new order from the ruins. The Brazilian case falls farther afield. There has been notable state repression, but not reaching Chilean or Argentine proportions. Regime policy has also been characterized by demand satisfaction and growth. The far less authoritarian Mexican case then raises more starkly the possibility that the "early" advent of authoritarianism may obviate the need for Chilean-style BA politics, or that time breeds moderation, or that the regime is not really BA. Whatever the validity of such speculations, it is worth appreciating the actual differences that appear in contemporary reality. To say that regimes behave differently largely due to their genesis does not minimize the differences. Furthermore, these differences may refer not just to divergent means of effecting similar

policies and regime control but to very dissimilar policies. Our findings on Chilean higher education policy can be generalized much more appropriately to Argentina or even to Brazil in the sixties, than to Brazil in the late seventies or to Mexico.

Footnotes

[1]A few words of historical-structural description on the Chilean higher education system are in order. The University of Chile was founded in 1842 on the Napoleonic model of a single public instituion delegated by the state to administer higher education. A Catholic University was created in 1888 in reaction to liberal secularism. Five more private universities would be created subsequently, along with one public Technical University. Chile's eight institutions have been notable for the comparative lack of differentiation in structure, finance, mission or quality; despite certain important differences, standardization has held more in Chile than in most of Latin America. The limited number of institutions has facilitated this. By the 1950s significant strides were taken to modernize the previously profesionally-oriented university and in the 1950s and 1960s enormous enrollment expansion occurred. Networks developed of regional colleges, modelled after the University of California. Traditionally, Chile's universities were regarded as among the best in Latin America.

[2]"Reflections on the Pattern of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978), p. 6 and 3-38 passim. See also O'Donnell's Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973), and his "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa: Pittsburgh University, 1976), pp. 47-89. A critical review essay on O'Donnell's work has recently appeared: David Collier, "Industrial Modernization and Political Change," World Politics 30, no. 4 (1978), pp. 593-614.

[3]A recent formulation can be found in Linz's "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. III, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 175-

411. It should be clear, therefore, that I am not dealing with O'Donnell's formulation alone or undertaking a critique of it, but using it as a very general reference point to a good deal of literature on the regimes in question. It is not necessary for our purposes here to specify the points of divergence between O'Donnell's work and that of Linz, Collier, Malloy, the Purcells', Stepan, etc.

[4]Overviews of junta repression in the universities appear in: Galo Gómez, Chile de hoy, educación, cultura, y ciencia (México: Casa de Chile, 1976); Michael Fleet, "Academic Freedom and University Autonomy in Chile," Newsletter of the Latin American Studies Association 23, no. 2 (1977), pp. 23-38; Richard Fagen and Patricia Fagen, "The University Situation in Chile: A statement Prepared for the House Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs, June 18, 1974," Ibid. 5, no. 3 (1974), pp. 30-37. A good book review essay on early post-coup literature on Chilean politics generally is found in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," Latin American Research Review 10, no. 3 (1975), pp. 155-75.

[5]For a discussion of democracy-dictatorship generally see Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven, Ct.: Yale University, (1971), pp. 17-32; cross-nationally, see Charles Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1970); longitudinally in a given nation, see Enrique A. Baloyra, "Budget Analysis: Methods and Issues with Application to Venezuela," paper given at the 1973 meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8. On civil-military: Philippe Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967," in On Military Intervention, ed., Morris Janowitz and J. van Doorn (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University, 1971), pp. 425-506. On communist-capitalist: Fredric Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Nobleton, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., 1968). And the literature on comparative state politics has

found much evidence that level of economic development determines policy far more than e.g., the degree of inter-party competition. See, for example, Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); however, subsequent analyses penetrated some of the macro categories and did demonstrate the importance of political factors: see, for example, Ira Scharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review 53 (September 1969), pp. 867-78.

[6]Two very useful overviews are found in Robert Ayres, "Political Regimes, Explanatory Variables, and Public Policy in Latin America," Journal of Developing Areas 10, no. 1 (1975), pp. 15-36, and Karen Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 13, no. 2 (1978), pp. 39-54.

[7]Ayres, pp. 23-32; Remmer, pp. 48-49; Charles Anderson, "System and Strategy in Comparative Policy Analysis: A Plea for Contextual and Experiential Knowledge," in Willian Gwyn and George Edwards, Eds., Perspectives on Public Policy-Making (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1975), pp. 219-41.

[8]See, for example, a recent statistical analysis of educational policy outcomes in 102 nations. It has affirmed that socioeconomic variables have more impact than political variables, especially on expenditures. Joel G. Verner, "Socioeconomic Environment, Political System, and Educational Policy Outcomes," Comparative Politics 11, no. 2 (1979), pp. 165-89. For a harsh commentary on this research see Alfred Diamant's editorial correspondence, Comparative Politics 12, no. 1 (1979), pp. 123-4.

[9]Robert Drysdale and Robert Myers accomplish this in their, "Continuity and Change: Peruvian Education," in Abraham Lowenthal, ed., The Peruvian Experiment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1975), pp. 254-301.

[10]See especially, "Reflections," p. 6.

[11]These figures come from Treasury data. "Análisis financiero de la educación superior chilena: período 1965-1978" (Santiago, 1978), anexo 2. The percentage of total students in higher education grew from 2.8% in 1967 to 4.6% in 1975. A peak of around 147 thousand was hit in 1975, falling to about 131 thousand by 1977.

[12]The figures on vacantes come from Consejo de Rectores, Anuario estadístico 1977 (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1978), p. 7. The vacante/enrollment ratios come from ibid., pp. 7-8 and the Consejo's Boletín informativo interno: ano 1974 (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1974), p. 2. The ratio may now increase a bit since 1978 vacantes increased.

[13]Hacienda, "Análisis," anexo 2. The University's share held between 48% and 51% from 1965-1970, and then around 43%-44% from 1971-1976, excluding 1973, before falling to 40% in 1977.

[14]Consejo, Anuario, p. 7. The University of Concepción is the only other to lose in proportional terms.

[15]Projections cited in Gómez, p. 52 and compared to actual figures in the Consejo's Anuario, p. 8. UNESCO's projections may have been unduly based on linear regressions and therefore exaggerated (since secondary school growth would slow). Angel Bate Carter shows that the historic growth line would result in enrollments flooding to over 500,000 by 1980; actual figures will be only about one-fourth of that. "El sistema educativo chileno," in Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, ed., Universidad e integración andina (Santiago: C.P.U., 1974), p. 303.

[16]Ernesto Schiefelbein and María Clara Grossi, "Análisis de la matrícula escolar en Chile," Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación, documento de trabajo #10 (1978), pp. 20-21. Although the growth of secondary school enrollments slowed after 1973, growth continued. For every 100 students in 1970, these were 148 in 1973 and 169 in 1978. Data from the Ministry of

Hacienda.

[17]Based on data obtained from the Consejo and the University of Chile.

[18]Schiefelbein and Grossi, p. 34. From 1969 to 1971 the number of students in the last year of secondary school actually doubled.

[19]I am basing this admittedly controversial assessment on the testimony of many D.C. partisans, corroborated by other ex-university people more to the left and of course the right.

[20]According to Edgardo Boeninger, the University of Chile's (DC) rector during Chile's U.P. years, the "university for all" was a demagogic slogan never taken seriously by university policy-makers. Nonetheless, it contributed to a perceived threat. Interview with Boeninger, November 1978, Santiago.

[21]Apparently, female enrollments have suffered disproportionately: Schiefelbein and Grossi, p. 21.

[22]I personally might incline toward a modified version of the position of the venerable ex-rector of the University of Chile, Juan Gomez Millas. Fully rejecting the junta's brutish approach, he nonetheless would limit university expansion, funnelling much of the demand for higher education to technical institutes and teacher colleges. Interview, November, 1978, Santiago.

[23]Data from the Ministry of Culture and Education.

[24]The figures from 1972-1979 are 79,531 (1972), 106,347 (1973, 128,355 (1974), 102,590 (1975), 90,772 (1976), 42,523 (1977), 46,328 (1978), and 51,915 (1979). Ministry of Education and Culture data.

[25]Interview with Jaime Lucas Lennon, rector of the University of Buenos Aires, December 1978, Buenos Aires.

[26]It seems likely that explicitly restrictive quotas have been less necessary in Argentina than in Chile. While Argentina's economic situation has been less severe in terms of unemployment, it has been more severe for the middle sectors that expected to attend higher education. Furthermore, Argentina's cohort group attending higher education was greater than Chile's. Thus it has become comparatively more difficult for more Argentines to manage the luxury of spending extra years in school, and therefore less necessary to cut enrollments by quotas.

[27]Alfonso Ocampo Londoño, Higher Education in Latin America (New York: ICED, 1973), p. 37.

[28]See Jerry Haar, The Politics of Higher Education in Brazil (New York: Praeger, 1977).

[29]Pedro Lincoln Carneiro Leão de Mattos, "Políticas do governo federal na expansão do ensino no Brasil," (unpublished manuscript, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, table 2).

[30]Interview with ex-Minister Raymundo Moniz de Aragão, December 1978, Rio de Janeiro.

[31]Ministerio de Educação e Cultura, Catálogo geral das instituições de ensino superior (1974), p. 12.

[32]Centro de investigaciones socioeconómicas (CISEC) del Centro Bellarmino, "Sector universidad (D6)," pp. 6, 19.

[33]When I cite simply the Catholic University I refer to the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago, although in very general terms, the Catholic University of Valparaiso has followed a similar course.

[34]CISEC, p. 11. For example, the Technical University's Faculty of General Studies was almost completely changed.

[35]Treasury, "Análisis," p. 24.

[36]"Universidad: la drástica reorganización," Ercilla, October 20, 1973, pp. 17-19.

[37]"Universidad Católica: Crisis con la jerarquía," Hoy June 13-14, pp. 11-15.

[38]I base my interpretation largely on interviews with both deposed personnel and sitting personnel.

[39]Gomez, p. 15.

[40]Luis Alvarez Baltierra, "Definiciones," Ercilla, January 21, 1976, pp. 9-10.

[41]Statement of René Orozco Sepúlveda, interviewed, November, 1978, Santiago.

[42]Some DC partisans suggest that a similar trajectory has befallen the University of Concepción, except that the initial 1973 purge was greater in scope; in 1975 there was apparently a major effort to increase active control over university policies.

[43]A very good account appears in Ignacio González, "Otra etapa dura," Hoy, January 30-February 5, 1980, pp. 8-10. I have been told of a poignant incident in which a top minister confronted the Rector of the University of Chile at a party and told him that a recently-written study was bad, and detrimental to the junta: fire the author. The Rector refused. A few minutes later General Pinochet came over and reiterated the government's demand, receiving a predictably dutiful "yes, my general."

[44]Drysdale and Myers note that Peruvian rectors have gained "unusually wide power" compared to the pre-military era. "Continuity and Change," pp. 286-87.

[45]Interview with Julio Caillet Bois, December 1978, Buenos Aires.

[46]By 1979 Argentina had its third education minister since 1976. Since 1962 it has had an average of nearly one per year.

[47]O'Donnell, Modernization, pp. 97-100 and "Corporatism," p. 71.

[48]On student activism: Patricio E. Chaparro, "University Student Activism and Leadership," unpublished dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1975; Ben Burnett, Political Groups in Chile (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1970), pp. 80-84. On university partisan strife in general, Carlos Huneeus, La Reforma (Santiago: Corporacion Promocion Universitaria, 1973).

[49]Fleet, p. 25.

[50]See Henry Landsberger and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970-1973," World Politics 28, no. 4 (1976), pp. 502-41. A comment is in order concerning the debate over whether the UP respected university autonomy. I support the point made by Patricial Fagen and others that the Allende government did little against university autonomy, in fact managing very little orienting policy. See Patricia Weiss Fagen, Chileans Universities: Problems of Autonomy and Dependence (Beverly Hills: Sage Comparative Politics Series, #01-048, 1973), pp. 19-20, 40-41. Nonetheless, autonomy (in many senses of the word) suffered from an uncontrolled politicization and challenge to ideological diversity and tolerance.

[51]Thus, for example, the Technical University would be the scene of bloody battle in September 1973 and subsequent occupation by troops, more infiltrated by security checks.

[52]CISEC, p. 26.

[53]These are the respective views, for example, of the prominent ex-rectors of the University of Chile (Edgardo Boeninger) and the Catholic University (Fernando Castillo), both interviewed in Santiago, November 1978.

[54]Details taken from CISEC, pp. 20-24; Odette Magnet and Jaime Moreno, "La nueva institucionalidad estudiantil," Hoy #49 (1978), pp. 16-18; Patricia Verdugo, "Pasos a la apertura," Hoy #77 (1978), pp. 14-15.

[55]Ibid., p. 14.

[56]Quotes in "FEUC impulsa nuevo sistema," El Mercurio, November 18, 1978, and CISEC, p. 25, respectively.

[57]Some students claimed that they had been expressing solidarity with fellow students in Nicaragua, but the symbolism of their protests was too clear.

[58]Philippe Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1971), p. 206. For example many Chilean students have apparently declined nominations to official leadership positions. "La nueva," Hoy, #49, p. 17.

[59]Odette, Magnet, "Después de seis años," Hoy May 2-8, 1979, pp. 9-10.

[60]Simón de Ases, "El decaimiento de la Universidad de Chile," Mensaje #248 (1979), p. 174; "Informe universitario," Ercilla #2.120 (March 1976). p. 31.

[61]CISEC, p. 22. Some claim to observe changing, conformist hair and dress modes.

[62]See Fagen, Chilean Universities, for a discussion of dependency and higher education in pre-coup Chile.

[63]César Ruiz Danyau, quoted in "Nueva reorientación," El Mercurio, November 2, 1973.

[64]Comparing first year openings to total enrollments shows some changes, (e.g., an increase in natural science and technical fields from 32% to 37%, but there is the possibility of distortion due to differential

drop-out rates by field. Consejo de Rectores, Anuario estadístico 1976 (Santiago: Consejo de Rectores, 1977), pp. 8-9. Unfortunately, cupo figures for the early junta years were not available.

[65]I labelled natural sciences, math, and engineering as favorable, agricultural and medical sciences as ambiguous, and social science, law, humanities, education and architecture as unfavorable. Enrollments 1973-1977 increased from 31.8% to 32.5% in the first, from 16.7% to 17.0% in the second, and decreased from 51.5% to 50.3% in the third. Data taken from Ibid., 1977, p. 14 and Consejo de Rectores, Boletín, pp. 7-20. One could disaggregate the categories more finely and probably discover greater changes but the overall lack of greater change is probably the major reasonably safe finding.

[66]Data from División de Admisión, "Informativo #2," Universidad de Concepción, 1977, p. 18, and Consejo, Anuario, 1977, p. 8.

[67]Ibid., p. 7 and CISEC, p. 2.

[68]Ibid., pp. 39, 30.

[69]"Recursos universitarios," (editorial), June 27, 1977 and "Problemas," (editorial), March 20, 1977.

[70]"Universidades: las cartas sobre la mesa," Ercilla August 24, 1977, p. 71.

[71]Universidad Católica de Chile, Cuenta del Rector (Santiago: UCCh, 1976), p. 16. Much of my account here is based on interviews with present research and planning directors in the four biggest universities.

[72]In the Catholic University (1975), for example, practically all money went to the biological, exact and technical sciences (Ibid., p. 17). And in 1977, for example, the central office apparently rejected about half the proposals submitted. Raúl Cañas Cruchaga, La investigación

(Santiago: UCCh, 1978), pp. 3-4.

[73]Unfortunately, my data on the University of Buenos Aires are not comparable since they deal with cupo (allowed openings) in 1978 and 1979 and actual first year enrollments in 1976; these data might suggest an increase in science and technology at the expense of medicine but it is more prudent to reserve judgement. (Data given by the Direccion Nacional de Políticas y Programación Presupuestaria, Ministerio de Cultura y Educación.) Indicative of the parochialism in education was the denunciation of the "new math" which "undermined" the family because parents could not explain it to their children.

[74]For any number of reasons, of which government control is only one, probably minor one, graduate enrollments (1974) were 33% in the natural, exact and technical sciences, and 45% in the human and social sciences, compared to respective undergraduate figures of 21% and 63%. Anuário estadístico do Brasil 1976, pp. 649, 656-58.

[75]Interview with Simon Schwartzman, Rio, November 1979.

[76]To broaden the comparison: Mexico differs from all three. Since Mexican universities generally are considerably more autonomous, the government has tried to orient research via the National Council. But, in fact, there has been a succession of such Councils with each administration and they manage to wrest little power from the universities and their individual faculties.

[77]O'Donnell, "Reflections," p. 17; of course this does not mean that every BA will cut these expenditures, as the Brazilian case will show. The Chilean junta, in an effort to express its priorities through the budget, quickly eliminated certain special financial laws mandating proportional allocations. Hacienda, "Análisis," p. 16.

[78]Interview with, and data from Jorge Claro, Santiago, November, 1978.

[79]A further benefit projected is that reductions in government subsidies should spur efficiency by decentralizing power from the ministry to the institutions--but few are audicious enough to claim that decentralization has advanced beyond political-economic theory.

[80]"Universidades: ¿cómo financiarlas?" ¿Que Pasa?, August 9, 1974, p. 32. It is important to realize, however, that "university" covers a good deal more ground in Chile than elsewhere. There are no non-university technical institutes of higher education, many sub-professional careers are taught at the university, national research is concentrated there, and "extension" programs (including costly T.V.) have been significant. One need not approve of the junta to see that there is a lot to the argument about subsidies and equity throughout Latin America; it seems particularly strong in Chile. This may be an excellent reflection, in very general terms, of the much-cited dichotomy between Chile's advanced political and lagging socio-economic development. Thus polyarchical freedoms permitted middle-class groups to exert great power, often through political parties, guaranteeing governmental support for "their" institution. Meanwhile, expenditures on grade-school education reflected the country's relative weak economic status (especially since many of the well-to-do attended private schools). Having said all this, I might reiterate my earlier belief about admissions: that government cutbacks (plus tuition) will make higher education itself more regressive but, if accompanied by reallocation to lower levels, could make the education system overall somewhat less regressive. According to ODEPLAN figures, pre-school and primary education (41% to 49%) have prospered at the expense of higher education (46% to 36%), from 1974-77. "Itinerario de la evolución económica y social," Santiago, 1978, p. 43. But if we compute education's share, excluding

higher education, of the national budget, we find it remarkably stable from 1965-1978, with only a small standard deviation around an annual average of 10.0%, the same average managed from 1975-78. The peak period was 1967-1972. Data from Hacienda, "Analisis," p. 8. The junta has not thus far redistributed the savings from higher education to other levels.

[81]"Reflections," p. 8. Greater pre-coup threats may lead to greater cohesion within the dominant elites and more exclusion of middle as well as popular sectors.

[82]See Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica: Rand, 1971) on the role of war colleges and of "non-military" social work. The tuition issue may strain the notion of non-ideological "guiding mentalities" in authoritarian regimes. Two caveats are in order, however: (1) counter-revolutionary ideology may characterize only the post-coup pre-institutionalization period; (2) although the tuition idea was indeed official government policy, the entire government was never united on it nor implemented it fully. Still, the ideological content was quite notable. In a confidential, in-house document, the economic group within Education presented an elaborate case for tuition. "Borrador de anteproyecto para la operacion de un sistema del cobro de la docencia en las universidades chilenas." (November, 1976).

[83]While the University of Chile's Faculty of Economics split, even its non-marxist sector was not Chicago oriented.

[84]For example, the Minister of Finance, Sergio de Castro is a Chicago Ph.D.; Miguel Kast, the first major proponent of tuition, and now vice president of ODEPLAN, is a Chicago Boy; Central Bank President Alvaro Bardon is another; Jorge Claro, principal author of the confidential plan cited in note #82, served for a while in Education but remains an important

advisor even though officially out of government and back in private enterprise.

[85]Such an analysis would require too much space here. Among the important factors have been: the overambitiousness of the original plan, technical difficulties of establishing workable mechanisms to recover loans, limited economic capacities of most individual students, actual and potential middle class opposition, divisions within the government itself, preoccupation with less difficult issues, and a degree of regime "institutionalization" and return to political calm. Significantly, increased tuition was also announced--and at leat temporarily postponed--for the public secondary schools.

[86]On the plans: Hacienda, "Análisis," p. 28; Educación, "Borrador," p. 2 (erroneously) foresees a "transition period" of a maximum of three years of further subsidization. The 1965-1978 data came from Hacienda, "Análisis," p. 13. The lows had come in 1974-1974. Financial data from different souces, even within the government, are not consistent. Figures on higher education's share of the budget, for example, range from 41% to over 50% for 1974. I have used Hacienda's data, probably the best, certainly the most official.

[87]The Economist reports that the public sector's share of the GDP shrunk from 43% in 1973 to 30% in 1979. "Chile's counter-revolution: A Survey," February 2, 1980, p. 21.

[88]Hacienda, "Análisis," p. 10. Carmen Luz Latorre presents data that fundamentally confirm the pattern of decline and recovery for education in general as compared to total budgetary expenditures and to GNP. After sharp drops in 1974 and 1975, 1976 figures approximate 1974 figures and 1977 figures approximate 1973 figures. "La asignación de recursos a educación en los últimos años," Estudios Sociales 20, 2 (1979), p. 74.

[89]While the University of Chile fell from about 52% to 43% (1978), the Catholic University increased from about 11% to 14% (1978). The discrepancy is greater if we turn from annual government subsidies to foundation loans: in 1977, the Catholic University received greater than three-quarters of all capital investment, due largely to a major loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. Ibid., appendices.

[90]Fear of the government's long-awaited plan for higher education is strongest in the University of Chile. Professors there resent what they characterize as an attempt to reduce their "National" stands to the mere status of one of eight.

[91]Education's share of the national budget reached 7.3% and 9.0% in 1977 and 1978, respectively. Higher education's share of the national education budget, 31.6% as an annual average 1973-1975, fell to 28.6% (1976) and 27.4% (1977), but rebounded to 33.3% (1978). From 1975-1976, education's claim on the GNP fell from 2.2% to 1.3%. Data from the Dirección Nacional de Políticas y Programación Presupuestaria, Ministerio de Cultura y Educación. These cuts occurred notwithstanding the fact that about 85% of the national universities' budget goes to personnel costs. Ibid. Apparently, the government's policy is to disfavor the big national universities. Interview with Alberto Taquini hijo Buenos Aires, December 1978.

[92]Ministerio, "Estadisticas de la educacion, 1977," Buenos Aires, 1977, p. 7.

[93]From 2.9% in 1964 it hit 3.6% in 1965 and has fluctuated some but stayed around 3.8% (1978). Leão De Mattos, table 7. Education's share of the federal budget has apparently increased: 6.8% (1964) to a high of 10.7% (1968) and, after fluctuating, 9.4% (1977). Based on data from Haar, p. 39 and Anuario estadístico do Brasil 1976, p. 718. But Philippe

Schmitter found different data and reported a "surprisingly stable" pattern from 1964-1971, which he attributed to the lack of correlation between military regime type and educational expenditures. "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil" in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1973), pp. 196-97. BA regime type affords a more discriminating independent variable than "military" regime type from which to predict policy expenditures but certainly not a sufficiently accurate one, at least until many factors associated with the particular BA are known.

[94]See, for example, José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977) and James Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," in Authoritarianism and Corporatism, ed. Malloy (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1977).

[95]O'Donnell does, however, categorize the regime as exclusionary. "Reflections," p. 29.

[96]"Reflections," pp. 28-29.

[97]I draw freely on my earlier work. See University and Government in Mexico: Autonomy in an Authoritorian System (New York: Praeger, 1980). Enrollments in public higher education account for roughly 85% of the total. The private institutions enjoy far more autonomy from government.

[98]"University Autonomy in Mexico: Implications for Regime Authoritarianism," Latin American Research Review 14, 3 (1979), pp. 140-46.

[99]Even for the Chilean case, we have alluded to a number of internal contradictions which negate an unambiguous regime type-policy link. For example: there is student opposition, faculty opposition, and variable policy change depending on the academic subject matter. (On these factors see also Manuel Antonio Garretón M., "Universidad y política en los procesos de

transformación y reversión en Chile, 1967-1977," FLACSO working paper SCL103.04/79/080, pp. 53-55). Other contradictions include the tensions between rectors and ministry and, more broadly, between free market-oriented advocates of greater institutional decentralization and more statist advocates of centralized control. And certainly more could be said about the difficulties of imposing a harsh, rationalized policy upon an institution with a relatively privileged constituency, socially overlapping the ruling elite itself.